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OPINION OF THE COURT

30
31
32
33

SEITZ, Circuit Judge.
Paul N. Johnson ("Defendant") was indicted by a federal

34

grand jury for conspiracy to distribute narcotics, see 21 U.S.C.

35

§ 846, possession and distribution of narcotics, in violation of

36

21 U.S.C. § 841, and related firearms offenses, see 18 U.S.C.

37

§§ 922(g), 924(a)(2), (c)(1), (c)(2).

38

here from an order of the district court granting Defendant's

39

pretrial motion to suppress contraband seized by the Pennsylvania

40

State Police during a vehicle search.

The government appeals

The district court had

3

1

jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction

2

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.

3

the disposition of this appeal.

The trial has been stayed pending

I. FACTS

4

The historic facts are taken from the memorandum

5
6

decision filed by the district court, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(e),

7

after the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress the seized

8

materials.
A Pennsylvania State Trooper, while following a vehicle

9
10

traveling on Interstate 78 toward Harrisburg and driven by

11

Defendant, noticed "several large objects," which appeared to be

12

air fresheners, hanging from its inside rearview mirror.

13

he believed the hanging objects constituted a violation of the

14

Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, see 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4524(c)

15

(Supp. 1994),1 the trooper engaged his overhead lights and

16

signaled for the vehicle to pull to the side of the road.

17

After both vehicles stopped, the trooper asked

18

Defendant to produce his driver's license and automobile

19

registration card.

20

license bearing the name "Tracy Lamar Washington."

21

was unable to produce an automobile registration card, a

1

Because

Defendant produced a South Carolina driver's
Although he

Section 4524(c) provides in relevant part:
(c) Other obstruction.─No person shall drive
any motor vehicle with any object or material
hung from the inside rearview mirror . . . as
to materially obstruct, obscure or impair the
driver's vision through the front windshield
or any manner as to constitute a safety
hazard.
Title 75, § 4524(c).

4

1

violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, see 75 PA. CONS. STAT.

2

ANN. § 1311(b) (Supp. 1994), Defendant told the trooper that he

3

owned the vehicle. See Appendix at A60-A61.

4

trooper went to his patrol car and had the police dispatcher run

5

a check on the vehicle's license number.

6

At that point, the

While waiting for the vehicle check to be completed,

7

the trooper spoke separately with Defendant and the other

8

occupants of the vehicle.

9

conversations Defendant as well as the passengers seemed

According to the trooper, during these

10

"unusually" and "exceptionally" nervous and gave the trooper

11

conflicting statements about the origin and the destination of

12

their trip.

13

passengers, he could identify another one only as "T."

14

trooper testified that the circumstances caused him to suspect

15

that there were narcotics or contraband in the vehicle.

16

Although Defendant knew the name of one of the
The

The trooper asked Defendant whether there was anything

17

illegal in the vehicle, and Defendant replied in the negative.

18

The trooper then asked Defendant for his consent to search the

19

car and presented him with a consent form to read and sign.

20

Although Defendant would not sign the form, the trooper testified

21

that he orally consented to the search.

22

followed, the trooper discovered one-half pound of marijuana, one

23

and one-half ounces of cocaine, one ounce of a substance often

24

used to "cut" cocaine, and a digital scale.

25

trooper read the adult occupants of the vehicle their Miranda

26

rights, then placed them under arrest, and seized the contraband.

In the search that

At that point, the

5

1

Defendant was first charged in state court with a

2

number of violations under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the Drug

3

Code, and the Vehicle Code.

4

motion to suppress the seized drugs and other contraband.

5

Court of Common Pleas for Berks County, Pennsylvania suppressed

6

the seized materials found in the vehicle because it concluded

7

that they were obtained during an unlawful search.

8

was later nolle prossed. See id. at A71.

9

He, thereafter, filed a pretrial
The

That action

Defendant was also charged in the district court with

10

federal narcotics and firearms violations.

11

suppress the same materials obtained by the trooper following the

12

traffic stop.

13

pretrial suppression hearing and concluded that the traffic stop

14

was used by the trooper as a pretext, that is, a legal

15

justification for an otherwise unconstitutional vehicle stop

16

based on suspicion of narcotics possession. See United States v.

17

Johnson, No. 1:CR-94-145-01, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24,

18

1994) ("Mem. Op.").

19

subsequent search and seizure were tainted by this pretextual

20

stop and the seized materials were suppressed.

21

appeals that order.

Thereafter, the district court conducted a

24
25

As a result, the court found that the

II.

22
23

Again, he moved to

The government

DISCUSSION

Some preliminary observations are appropriate to an
understanding of the structure of this opinion.
We emphasize that this is an appeal by the government

26

from an order of the district court granting Defendant's pretrial

27

suppression motion.

In the district court, Defendant set forth

6

1

what we understand to be two grounds for suppression: (1) the

2

traffic stop that eventuated in the seizure of the illegal

3

materials was unconstitutional, thus tainting the seizure; and

4

(2) the real reason for the traffic stop was to find a way to

5

search for drugs and not to enforce the traffic laws.

6

the memorandum decision of the district court, it rejected

7

Defendant's first ground but relied on the second, i.e., pretext,

8

to grant his motion.

9

As we read

On appeal the government attacks the district court's

10

pretext finding, which, of course, the Defendant supports.

11

will initially address whether the district court erred in its

12

ruling on the first ground in Defendant's motion.

13

because if the district court erred in that determination, it

14

would be unlikely that the more complex pretext issue would be

15

decided. See, e.g., United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 435

16

n.3 (5th Cir. 1993).

17
18

A.

We

We do so

Was The Traffic Stop Justified?

The United States Supreme Court has held that stopping

19

a car and detaining its occupants is a seizure under the Fourth

20

Amendment. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226

21

(1985); see also United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1081

22

(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990).

23

stop to check a driver's license and registration is

24

constitutional when it is based on an "articulable and reasonable

25

suspicion that . . . either the vehicle or an occupant" has

26

violated the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979);

However, a

7

1

see Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1081; see also 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

2

§ 6308(b) (Supp. 1995).2
As a general rule, the burden of proof is on the

3
4

defendant who seeks to suppress evidence. See United States v.

5

Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1256 n.9 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations

6

omitted).

7

for his motion, i.e., the search or seizure was conducted without

8

a warrant, the burden shifts to the government to show that the

9

search or seizure was reasonable. See United States v. McKneely,

10

However, once the defendant has established a basis

6 F.3d 1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1993).
The trooper testified that he stopped Defendant's

11
12

vehicle because, based on what he saw, he believed it was in

13

violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. See Appendix at A57.

14

As we read the district court's memorandum decision, it accepted

15

this testimony. See Mem. Op. at 12, 14.

16

exceeds the showing required of the government to justify the

17

traffic stop under Prouse, which requires only an articulable and

18

reasonable suspicion that the car was in violation of

19

Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,

20

109 (1977); Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1081.

21

not clearly erroneous, we conclude that the district court

2

This finding of fact

Because this finding is

Under section 6308(b) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, a
trooper who has reasonable and articulable grounds to believe
that a vehicle or driver is in violation of the Vehicle Code may
stop the vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Benton, 655 A.2d 1030, 1033
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). Although an actual violation need not be
established, a reasonable basis for the officer's belief is
required to validate the stop. See id.; Commonwealth v. McElroy,
630 A.2d 35, 40-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).

8

1

correctly determined that the trooper's basis for the stop,

2

standing alone, met Fourth Amendment requirements.
B. The Pretext Issue

3

Although the traffic stop itself met constitutional

4
5

requirements, the district court suppressed the seized materials

6

because it found that the traffic stop was merely a pretext to

7

find a basis to thereafter search Defendant's vehicle for

8

narcotics and, as such, was violative of the Fourth Amendment.

9

See Mem. Op. at 16.

We now determine whether the district court

10

applied the proper standard in determining that the stop was

11

pretextual.

12

subject to plenary review. See United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d

13

192, 196 (3d Cir. 1993).

This important issue presents a question of law

In evaluating the constitutionality of a police traffic

14
15

stop, most courts agree that an objective analysis of the facts

16

and circumstances surrounding the stop is appropriate. See, e.g.,

17

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978); United

18

States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States

19

v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.

20

833 (1987).

21

in applying this objective assessment to the argument that a

22

traffic stop, otherwise lawful, is really a pretext to search for

23

evidence of an unrelated serious crime and, thus, unlawful.

24

Neither the Supreme Court nor this court seems to have directly

25

addressed this constitutional issue.3
3

However, courts of appeals have had some difficulty

Some courts have characterized this court's opinion in United
States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1987) as endorsing the

9

1

The majority of the courts of appeals have adopted the

2

so-called "authorization test."

3

seized following a traffic stop are admissible so long as a

4

reasonable police officer could have made the stop (also known as

5

the "could" test).

6

time of the stop, the police officer reasonably believed the

7

defendant was committing a traffic offense, and whether the law

8

authorized a stop for such an offense.4

9

Under that approach, materials

These courts simply inquire whether, at the

A minority of the courts of appeals have adopted the

10

"usual police activities" test (also known as the "would" test).

11

Applying that test to a traffic stop, materials seized are

12

admissible as evidence only if a reasonable police officer would

13

have made the stop in the absence of an invalid purpose.5

14

courts inquire not only into the legality of the stop, but also

15

into its conformity with regular police practices.

These

"authorization" test. See, e.g., United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d
at 783; United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 389 (6th Cir.
1993). In Hawkins, the police gave a pretext, a traffic
violation, as the reason for stopping a vehicle whose occupants,
they believed, were involved in the purchase and sale of
narcotics. This court, without relying on the pretext asserted
by the police, found an objectively reasonable basis for the
stop. See Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 215. It stated that the pretext
used by the police did not render an otherwise constitutional
search invalid. See id. Therefore, the court was not required to
address the allegedly pretextual nature of the traffic stop.
4
See Whren, 53 F.3d at 375-76; Scopo, 19 F.3d at 782-84; United
States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1993); Ferguson, 8 F.3d at
389-91; United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936 (1991); United States v. Hope,
906 F.2d 254, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1990).
5
See United States v. Millan, 36 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Dirden, 38 F.3d 1131, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (11th Cir. 1991).

10

In this case the district court adopted the minority

1
2

approach, the usual police activities test.

3

"reasonable" trooper would not have stopped the vehicle for the

4

minor traffic violation here involved, absent a "hunch" that the

5

occupants were trafficking in narcotics. See Mem. Op. at 15-16.

6

The usual police activities test, the court reasoned, "is most

7

faithful to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 13.

8

Thus, we must decide, under a plenary standard of

9

It held that a

review, whether to adopt the minority standard employed by the

10

district court or the rule of the majority of the courts of

11

appeals.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that an

12
13

analysis of Fourth Amendment issues involves "`an objective

14

assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and

15

circumstances confronting him at the time' and not on the

16

officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action

17

was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)

18

(quoting Scott, 436 U.S. at 136); see Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 213-

19

14.

20

which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal

21

justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the

22

action so long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify

23

that action." Scott, 436 U.S. at 138; see United States v.

24

Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983) (stating that

25

the fact that customs officers boarding a ship pursuant to a

26

statute authorizing a check of the vessel's documentation

27

suspected that the vessel carried marijuana was not a violation

"[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind

11

1

of the Fourth Amendment); Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 214 ("Both the

2

Supreme Court and this court have held that a seizure that is

3

valid based upon the stated purpose cannot be challenged on the

4

grounds that the seizing officers were in fact motivated by an

5

improper purpose."); see also Velasquez, 885 F.2d at 1081.

6

conclude that the authorization test incorporates this objective

7

analysis.

8
9

We

On the other hand, the usual police activities test
applied by the district court is not a wholly objective test

10

because it requires a reviewing court to examine the motivations

11

and hopes of a police officer. See Mem. Op. at 9 ("The crux of

12

[the would] test is an objective analysis of what a reasonable

13

police officer would have done under the same circumstances

14

absent any underlying improper purpose.").

15

require a court to move past the objective facts and

16

circumstances, i.e., the traffic violation, and attempt to

17

ascertain an officer's true state of mind.

18

This approach would

In response to the government's argument seeking to

19

have us apply the majority view, Defendant and amicus, ACLU,

20

contend that the authorization standard will do nothing to

21

restrain the arbitrary exercise of discretionary police power.

22

See Defendant's Br. at 12; ACLU Br. at 11-14; see also United

23

States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In the

24

absence of some limit on police power to make such stops,

25

thousands of everyday citizens who violate minor traffic

26

regulations will be subject to unfettered police discretion as to

27

whom to stop."); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516

12

1

(10th Cir. 1988); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH

2

FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.4(e), at 28 (Supp. 1995) (arguing that the

3

authorization test has "conferred upon the police a virtual carte

4

blanche to stop people because of the color of their skin or for

5

any other arbitrary reason").

6

AND

SEIZURE, A TREATISE

ON THE

However, the police are subject to a number of

7

statutory and common law limitations.

For example, officers

8

cannot make a traffic stop without probable cause or a reasonable

9

suspicion, based on articulable facts, that a traffic violation

10

has occurred. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661; Velasquez, 885 F.2d at

11

1081; see also 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308(b).

12

evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop, a court is

13

free to examine the sufficiency of the reasons for the stop as

14

well as the officer's credibility.

15

Thus, in

Furthermore, a traffic stop must be reasonably related

16

in scope to the justification for the stop. See Berkemer v.

17

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 915;

18

Scopo, 19 F.3d at 785; United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726,

19

731 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994).

20

justify a greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic stop, the

21

totality of the circumstances known to the police officer must

22

establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support the

23

intrusion. See United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th

24

Cir. 1994); United States v. Hernandez, 872 F. Supp. 1288, 1293-

25

94 (D. Del 1994).

26

blanche" for an officer to engage in other unjustified action.

To

Clearly, a lawful traffic stop is not "carte

13

1

In addition, the authorization test ensures that the

2

validity of a traffic stop "is not subject to the vagaries of

3

police departments' policies and procedures" concerning the kinds

4

of traffic offenses which are enforced. Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392;

5

see Whren, 53 F.3d at 376; Scopo, 19 F.3d at 784.

6

validity of a traffic stop should be evaluated on the officer's

7

objective legal basis for the stop and not on whether the police

8

department routinely enforces a particular traffic law or assigns

9

a traffic officer to make such stops.

Therefore, the

It is not apparent why

10

police officers should be precluded from making an otherwise

11

valid traffic stop merely because by doing so they would be

12

departing from some routine.

13

We conclude that the district court erred in adopting

14

and applying the usual police activities test rather than the

15

authorization test in deciding that the basis for the vehicle

16

stop was a pretext to search for drugs.

17

standard, we recognize that any rule governing this issue can be

18

abused by the authorities.

But, that concern is inherent in the

19

nature of law enforcement.

Based on the foregoing, we now

20

examine Defendant's pretext argument in light of the standard we

21

have adopted.

22

In adopting the majority

We next consider whether we should go on and apply the

23

standard we adopt to Defendant's pretext argument or remand it

24

for resolution by the district court.

25

has already made the relevant factual findings, we will decide

26

this issue.

Because the district court

14

1

As we have noted, the district court found that the

2

trooper reasonably believed that Defendant's vehicle was in

3

violation of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. See supra at 7.

4

Applying the authorization test, we hold that the stop was not

5

unconstitutionally pretextual under the Fourth Amendment because

6

it was authorized under Pennsylvania law. See supra note 2.
III. CONCLUSION

7
8
9

The suppression order of the district court will be
vacated and Defendant's motion to suppress will be remanded to

10

the district court to decide whether the subsequent consent and

11

search were valid.

12

